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Abstract: The central bank acts as a social planner, and adjusts the real risk-free rate of return to correct any mispricing 
in the stock market so that the emergence of positive or negative bubbles is avoided. The analysis shows that the central 
bank must raise the risk-free rate in the case of a positive bubble, and vice versa. Moreover, the central bank should 
intervene in the stock market even if it does not have perfect information about the bubble. This is because the 
sequential dividend yields in the pricing equations are stationary. Thus, even the delayed reaction of the central bank 
prevents the fundamental value and the equilibrium price from drifting apart for extended periods.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
What should be the role of the central banks in the 
context of stock market bubbles? For example, 
Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Greenspan (2004), and 
Posen (2006) argue that the central bank should 
concentrate on inflation targeting and stable growth, 
while Bordo & Jeanne (2002), Bean (2004), and 
Roubini (2006) claim that the central bank should also 
tackle stock market bubbles. Yellen (2010) supports 
the latter view by stating that the central bank should 
intervene in stock market pricing, if the bubble gets 
dangerously large.  
Viewing the question from another angle, Maio 
(2014) provides empirical support to “don’t fight the 
Fed” –policy. He shows that the policy yields 
economically and statistically significant short-term 
gains comparing to buy-and-hold strategy. Obeying the 
“don’t fight the Fed” principle means that investors 
should react by increasing/decreasing risky 
investments in the stock markets when the central bank 
reduces/raises the risk-free rate of return.  
Furthermore, there are some practical examples of 
central banks’ attacks on currency market bubbles by 
adjusting the risk-free rate. For example, the central 
bank of Russia reacted to its national currency market 
bubble in 2014 by raising the key interest rate (Gilenko 
2017). 
Concerning the means of intervention, Conlon 
(2015) suggest that the central bank should use its 
informational advantage, and intervene by warning the 
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investors about noticeable bubbles. Thus, inaction of 
the central bank implicitly means that the stock prices 
can rise. Furthermore, the intervention by the central 
bank may make things even worse if it does not have 
private information about the bubble. Fischer (2016) 
makes a stronger point by arguing that, in the case of 
economy-wide bubbles, the central bank should 
intervene by monetary policy.  
A quite common perception about the proper cure 
for bubbles is the so called “leaning against the wind” 
type policy, which means that the risk-free rate must be 
lifted in order to de-inflate a positive bubble. However, 
there are confronting views, too. For example Gali 
(2014) claims that such a policy may actually make the 
bubble inflate even further. This may happen because 
the fundamental component of an asset price 
corresponds to the discounted stream of payoffs, but 
the bubble component has no payoffs to discount. 
Thus, the latter component grows at the rate of interest, 
at least in expectation.  
Inspired by the above argumentations, we present a 
simple financial market model, where the central bank 
is in charge of the adjustment of stock market bubbles. 
The adjustment is achieved by controlling the market 
real return of risk-free assets via monetary policy. The 
maneuverability of bubbles is studied both with and 
without perfect information about efficient stock market 
pricing and thus about the existence of bubbles. The 
model yields a “leaning against the wind” type rule for 
monitoring and correcting any mispricing, and 
stabilizing the financial market.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents 
related literature. Section 3 defines the basic model 
with informed and uninformed investors. Section 4 
presents the analysis of the equilibrium in the financial 
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market, and describes the interventions needed from 
the central bank to stabilize the financial market. 
Section 5 discusses the findings. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In our model, the key building block is the possibility 
of bubbles. The seminal efficiency argument by 
Samuelson (1973) is that, with perfectly rational risk-
neutral investors, the equilibrium stock price (Pt) is 
equal to the expected discounted dividends to the 
shareholder, that is the fundamental value (Vt). Tirole 
(1982) shows that Pt =Vt  holds also in the rational 
expectations equilibrium with long-lived risk averse 
investors so that infinite bubbles are impossible.  
However, Tirole (1985) argues that, in an 
overlapping generations model with short lived 
investors and infinitely lived assets bubbles are 
possible so that Pt !Vt  may occasionally happen. 
Santos & Woodford (1997) indicates that bubbles are 
impossible in rational markets only in the long run, but 
that there is a possibility of Pt !Vt  in the short run. 
The overlapping generations model is here 
interpreted so that rational investors have a short-term 
investing horizon. For example Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) argue that the short-lived-investor assumption 
can be motivated so that the majority of investors in the 
market are professional wealth managers who handle 
other people’s money with performance monitoring in 
short intervals. Delong et al. (1990), Froot et al. (1992), 
Campbell and Kyle (1993), Kyle and Xiong (2001), 
Shiller (2014), and Ilomäki (2016) argue that, if there 
are informed and uninformed short-term (that is short-
lived) investors in the market, Pt !Vt  exists because of 
the asymmetry and correlated behavior of the 
uniformed investors.  
Furthermore, Allen et al. (2006), and Bacchetta & 
Van Wincoop (2008) show that Pt !Vt  occurs in the 
case of short-lived investors, because their noisy 
private information incorporates rational higher-order 
beliefs into the equilibrium. Cespa & Vives (2015) also 
uses a model of short-lived investors with asymmetric 
information, and ends to two extreme equilibriums: a 
high information equilibrium Pt =Vt  with low volatility 
and high liquidity, and a low information equilibrium 
Pt !Vt  with high volatility and low liquidity.  
Therefore, our model builds on the assumption of 
asymmetric information among the investors, and on 
the argument of Loewenstein and Willard (2006) that 
the variation of the risk-free rate of return assures that 
Pt =Vt . Originally, the latter point derives from the 
property that the limited supply of risk-free assets pulls 
together the equilibrium price and the fundamental 
value, implying that Pt !Vt  is impossible regardless of 
the investors’ behavior. In our model, the central bank 
intervenes the market by controlling the supply of risk-
free assets thus setting the risk-free rate. 
3. THE MODEL 
The model follows Ilomäki (2016) with the extension 
of a time-varying real risk-free rate of return. The real 
rate is corrected for inflation so that where the gross 
inflation is determined as  
1+ ! t "
pt
pt#1
,            (1) 
where p  is the general price level in the economy. The 
economy consists of an infinite set of rational constant 
absolute risk-averse (CARA) investors, who have 
asymmetric information so that 0< µ <1 of them are 
informed, and 1!µ  of them are uninformed in every 
period. The atomistic investors live for two periods, 
investing in the first period, and consuming in the 
second period. 
There is an infinitely lived risky asset (share of firm 
F), and a risk-free alternative with time-varying real 
risk-free rate of return rt f . The investors allocate their 
investments between risk-free and risky assets. The 
portfolio choice is simplified, because the assumption 
of two-period lived CARA investors omits the possibility 
of hedging against changes in expected returns, and 
because the assumption of an infinitely lived risky asset 
constitutes limits for arbitrage in the overlapping 
generations model (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In 
addition, assuming normally distributed excess 
consumption, CARA investors assure that the 
conditional variance in excess returns is constant. 
There are four types of rational investors in every 
period t: young informed and uninformed investors who 
open their positions (the demand side), and old 
informed and uninformed investors who close their 
positions (the supply side). For simplicity, excess 
returns are normally distributed, the time-varying risk 
premium is common to all investors, and there are 
neither transaction costs nor taxes. The budget 
constraint comes from the assumption that all young 
investors at time t have the same individual endowment 
wty .   
The natural logarithm of the dividend Dt  on firm 
F’s stock follows random walk so that  
lnDt = lnDt!1 + etd ,           (2) 
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where etd ~WN(0,! d2 ) . This means that the change in 
the dividend at t is permanent. In period t, the dividends 
are paid to old investors.  
In period t, information common to all informed and 
uninformed investors consists of the history of 
equilibrium real prices (...Pt!3,Pt!2 ,Pt!1) , and the 
current value of the time varying real risk-free rate 
( rt f ). Moreover, all investors observe current real 
dividends ( Dt ), but the young informed investors have 
also private information on Dt+1. 
Assume that, in any period t, the central bank acts 
as a social planner with the aim to stabilize the financial 
markets by adjusting the real risk-free rate of return. 
The central bank may have perfect or imperfect 
information on the financial market. In any case, the 
current value of the real risk-free rate of return rt f  is 
determined by the adjustment to possible mispricing so 
that it is constant with zero variance from period t to 
period t+1. Supposing that the supply of the risk-free 
asset is in sole control of the central bank, the market 





! = 0 ,           (3) 
where ay  is the total demand by the young investors, 
and bcb is the total supply by the central bank in every 
period. 
Furthermore, assume exogenous noise traders with 
the distribution etnt ~ N(0,! nt2 )  in the stock market. 






" + etnt = 0 ,           (4) 
where xy refers to total demand of the stock by the 
young investors, and so is the total supply of the stock 
by the old investors. The optimal demand decisions 
produce the equilibrium price in period t thus fulfilling 
the market clearing condition. This happens because 
the old investors have to close their position to 
consume in the second period. 
Rational investors care also about the risk of the 
investment. LeRoy (1973) shows that if the risk-free 
rate of return is time-varying, and if all investors are risk 
averse, the proper discount rate includes the risk-free 
rate and a risk premium. Starting from Markowitz 
(1952) and Sharpe (1964), risk is defined as the 
variance of returns.  
A rational young investor maximizes individual utility 
by allocating the initial endowment between risky and 
risk-free assets. The maximization problem reads 
Max[E(!e!"ct+1 |#ty ,wty )]
s.t.
ct+1 = x f (1+ rt f )+ xrEt (Rt+1)
wty = x f + xr ,
         (5)  
where !t
y  is the information set, v > 0 is the coefficient 
of risk aversion, ct+1  is consumption when old, wty  is 
the endowment, and xf and xr denote the amount of 
money invested in risk-free and risky assets, 
respectively. The net excess return on a risky share is 
Rt+1 !
Pt+1 " Pt + Dt+1
Pt
" r f .          (6) 
Assuming normally distributed extra consumption, 
and plugging the consumption constraint into the utility 
function yields 
Et U(ct+1)[ ] = !e





,         (7) 
where ! r
2  is the constant variance of excess returns. 
Note that, since the investors observe rt f ,  its variance 
is zero. Maximize (7) with respect to xr, and use 
equation (6) to write the first order pricing condition for 
the risky asset, 
Pt =
Pt+1 + Dt+1
1+ rt f + xtr!" r2
.          (8) 
Manipulation of (8) results in the optimal investment 
decision, saying that the stock demand of a rational 
young investor reads  
xtr =
(Pt+1 + Dt+1) / Pt ! (1+ rt f )
"# r
2 .          (9) 
In equation (8), the required net real rate of return is 




" (1+ rt f ) =#t        (10) 
denotes the time-varying risk premium. In any period t, 
the investors know it upon the choice of xt
r . 
4. THE FINANCIAL MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
In the model, all informed investors have the best 
possible information, and old/young investors 
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recognize that young/old investors observe this. 
Recalling that the properties of random walk say that 
the change in the dividend at time t  is permanent, the 
rational choice represented by equation (8) results over 




=Vt .          (11) 
where rtn = rt f + xtirv! r2 ,  in which xir is the stock demand 
of an informed investor. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that equation (11) reflects the fundamental value of the 
risky asset, and that the informed investors follow the 
Samuelsonian pricing pattern, Pti =Vt . 
The uninformed investors observe the current real 
dividend Dt. Hence, the rational pricing rule for the 




,         (12) 
where rtn = rt f + xturv! r2 ,  in which xur is the stock 
demand of an uninformed investor. Using equations 
(11) and (12), and recalling that µ is the share of the 
informed investors, and 1-µ is the share of the 
uninformed investors, and i denotes informed and u 
denotes uninformed investors, the aggregate pricing 






.       (13) 
The market price given by equation (13) results 
from the asymmetry of information among the 
investors.  
Proposition 1: If the risk-free rate of return 
rises/falls, the investors’ attraction to risky investments 
diminishes/increases.  
Proof: Differentiation of equations (11) and (12) 









< 0,         (14) 
showing that an increase in the risk-free rate reduces 
risky investments of both informed and uninformed 
investors. Q.E.D. 
Corollary 1: If the risk-free rate rises/falls, the 
market price falls/rises, ceteris paribus. 
Proof: Differentiate Equation (13) against Pt  and 





(rt f +#ti )2
" (1"µ) Dt
(rt f +#tu )2
< 0 ,     (15) 
which shows that a rise/fall of the risk-free rate makes 
the market price of the stock fall/rise. Q.E.D. 
Consider an alternative case, where the uninformed 
investors operate as technical traders saying that they 
use past prices to estimate the fair price of today. 
Manipulating Equation (8), and taking one step 
backwards yields Ptu = (1+ rt!1f +"t!1u )Pt!1 ! Dt , which 
reduces to 
Ptu = (1+ rt f +!tu )Pt"1 " Dt        (16) 
since rt!1f = rt f  because the real risk-free rate remains 
unaltered unless the central bank interferes, and 
!t"1
u = xt"1ur v# r2 = xturv$r2 =!tu  because the uninformed 
investor makes the investment decision upon past 
prices. Differentiation of Equation (16) against xtur  and 






< 0,  
showing that a rise/fall in the risk-free rate makes 
investments in the risky asset fall/rise also for technical 
traders. 
By Equations (11) and (16), the aggregate pricing 
rule in the financial market reads  
Pt = µVt + (1!µ) (1+ rt f +"t )Pt!1 ! Dt#$ %& .      (17) 
Corollary 2: If the risk-free rate rises/falls, the 
market price falls/rises, ceteris paribus. 
Proof: Recall Equation (11), differentiate Equation 





(rt f +#t )2
+ (1"µ)Pt"1 .       (18) 
The effect is negative if µDt+1(1!µ)Pt!1
> rt f +"t( )
2
. That 
is the equilibrium price falls, if the weighted dividend 
return is larger than squared net required return, which 
is a reasonable assumption. Q.E.D. 
5. THE CENTRAL BANK  
The market price equations (13) and (17) imply a 
possibility for a bubble, and the task of the central bank 
is to avoid such bubbles by manipulating the real risk-
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free rate of return in order to cause desired market 
reactions described by equations (15) and (18). If the 
central bank possesses perfect information about the 
stock market and thus on bubbles, it is able to calculate 
the market stabilizing real risk-free rate from Equation 
(13) as follows: 




!"t .        (19) 
Consider also the case that the central bank does 
not possess perfect information about the market and 
bubbles. Assume that the central bank has the same 
imperfect information as the uniformed investors, 
knowing only Dt, and anticipating that Pt = Pt-1 and 
Dt+1 = Dt .  Thus, Equation (19) reads  




"#t .        (20) 
Proposition 2 The central bank should intervene in 
the stock market even if it does not have private 
information about it. 
Proof: Subtract Equation (20) from Equation (19), 
and write 











(  .       (21) 
By Equation (21), the difference of the real risk-free 
rates that are set with perfect and imperfect information 
equals the weighted difference between the real 
dividend yield at period t +1  and the real dividend yield 
at period t . The left-hand side of Equation (21) is 
stationary, if the right-hand side is stationary. Recall 
Equation (2), lnDt = lnDt!1 + etd . Hence, both 
components in the parenthesis on the right-hand side 
are stationary in Equation (21). The stationarity of the 
difference between the two real risk-free rates implies 
that Proposition 1 and Corollaries 1-2 apply also if the 
central bank possesses imperfect information on the 
stock market. Q.E.D. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The paper presents an overlapping generations 
model of rational investors with asymmetric 
information. The overlapping generations model is 
interpreted so that the wealth managers control 
people’s money, monitored in short-term intervals. The 
central bank, as a social planner, aims to dampen 
possible mispricing in the stock market by adjusting the 
real risk-free rate of return. The active role of the 
central bank is justified because uninformed investors 
make mistakes on pricing. By preventing bubbles to 
inflate the central bank avoids social losses caused by 
the development and eventual bursting of a super 
bubble.  
The analysis shows that the central bank responds 
to a marginal emergence of a positive bubble by using 
its available means to manipulate the real risk-free rate 
upwards thus reallocating the investments of investors 
from risky to risk-free assets. Likewise, a negative 
bubble is dampened by making the real risk-free rate 
fall thus directing investments from risk-free to risky 
assets. Thus, the policy adjustment of the real risk-free 
rate of return levels out any bubbles. Most, importantly, 
the method is effective even if the central bank has no 
private information about bubbles.  
The results of the paper are worth highlighting, 
because there does not exist a full consensus neither 
among academics nor among practitioners about the 
proper way to intervene in market bubbles. One key 
issue concerns the validity of the “leaning against the 
wind” policy. Ours results clearly justify the policy. To 
be more specific, a positive bubble must be tackled by 
raising the risk-free rate, and vice versa. 
Another important question is whether the central 
bank should have perfect information about the bubble. 
Our results simply show that, if the logarithm of 
dividends follows random walk, then even an 
interference based on delayed information is sufficient 
to prevent the developing of the wedge between the 
fundamental value and the equilibrium price in the 
stock markets. This happens because the difference of 
sequential dividend yields is stationary so that the 
equilibrium price follows a stochastic trend in the 
fundamental value. 
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